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Abstract
The reinsurance market is the secondary market for insurance risks. It has
a very speciÞc organization. Direct insurers do not trade risks with each
other. They cede part of their primarily underwritten portfolios mainly to
professional reinsurers with no direct business. This paper oﬀers a model of
equilibrium in reinsurance and capital markets where professional reinsurers
arise naturally to monitor primary insurers. The interplay of Þnancing and
reinsurance decisions facing primary insurers is also explicitly modelled. The
predictions are broadly in line with empirical evidence from the reinsurance
market.
1 Introduction
The reinsurance market is the market in which direct insurance companies
purchase covers for their primarily underwritten portfolios, or "cede" part of
their risks according to reinsurance terminology. Reinsurance is an important
feature of non life insurance business. Direct insurers have ceded business
worth USD 103 billion in 1997. This corresponds to an average cession rate,
or ceded premiums in terms of direct insurance premiums, of 14% (Swiss Re
1998)1.
The reinsurance market has a very speciÞc, "pyramidal", organization.
The generic reinsurance deal involves two sorts of pure players, a primary or
direct insurer and professional reinsurers. The primary insurer cedes all or
part of the risks she underwrites on the primary market to the professional
reinsurers whose purpose is to accept such secondary risks, but who do not
carry out any direct business. This is not to deny that some risk transfer
between direct insurers does also take place. But the bulk of reinsurance
transactions comply with this pattern: According to Swiss Re (1998) esti-
mations, the reinsurance business is dominated by specialized reinsurance
companies. Professional reinsurers provide more than 80% of global reinsur-
ance capacity, the top 4 providing around 30% of it.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple theory of reinsurance
where this pyramidal organization arises endogenously.
1Global data on reinsurance are somewhat scarce, partly because of the over-the-
counter nature of deals, and partly because it is diﬃcult to disentangle actual risk transfers
from internal reinsurance, aiming mainly at tax and regulatory arbitrage within insurance
groups. These Þgures stem from the last study publicly released by Swiss Re, considered
to be one of the most reliable sources within the industry.
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1.1 Motivation
Economists have provided two theoretical frameworks to analyze reinsurance.
The Þrst one consists in viewing reinsurance through the lenses of optimal
risk sharing among risk-averse agents. It has been pioneered by Borch (1962).
Indeed, Borch used reinsurance terminology to write his seminal contribution
to optimal risk sharing, and justiÞed this choice as follows:
"It is really suprising that economists have overlooked the
fact that the [risk sharing] problem can be studied, almost under
laboratory conditions, in the reinsurance market."
Surprisingly though, optimal risk sharing under complete information de-
livers very unsatisfactory predictions regarding the organization of reinsur-
ance2. If optimal risk sharing among "risk averse" insurance companies was
the primary driver for reinsurance, the pyramidal organization of the rein-
surance market would be dramatically ineﬃcient. Direct insurers would be
better oﬀ pooling their primary risks, possibly after deductibles to account
for moral hazard and adverse selection, and then take stakes in the pool in
accordance with their appetites for risk. However, in practice:
(i) The extent of pooling is limited. Indeed, direct insurers cede 14%
of their risks on average (no more than 3 or 4% for large groups). Thus it
seems that direct insurers seek to cede as little risk as possible, and not to
pool risks to the largest possible extent.
(ii) Direct insurers do not beneÞt directly from pooling. They use rein-
surance mainly to reduce their exposure on their primary portfolio, but only
2This is of course not to deny that Borch contribution to economics of uncertainty was
instrumental.
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marginally to gain some exposure on other primary risks. Optimal mutual-
ization takes place at the level of professional reinsurers only.
An empirical Þnding from Mayers and Smith (1990) conÞrms that di-
versiÞcation does not seem to be an important determinant of reinsurance
demand. Within a sample of US insurance companies, they Þnd that less
diversiÞed Þ
management and Þnancing decision. More precisely, a suﬃciently high credit
standing is a necessary input for insurance business, and capital and reinsur-
ance are two (imperfect) substitutes which can be used to meet it3. This is
documented by Garven and LammTennant (2003)! who Þnd that reinsurance
demand increases with Þnancial leverage. Consistent with this dual nature
of reinsurance is also the fact that in most prudential regulations (e.g. the
US Risk Based Capital or European Solvency Margin), the minimum capital
requirement is explicitly reduced by reinsurance purchase. More anecdoti-
cally, but interestingly, the so-called contracts of bottomry, which was the
prevailing form of reinsurance in Italy in "#$ th century, consisted in an ex
ante Þnancing whose repayment was conditioned by the absence of loss. The
risk management and Þnancing sides of the operation were not disentangled.
This paper develops a simple theoretical model of equilibrium in the rein-
surance market (i) which builds upon agency problems within insurance com-
panies, (ii) where the pyramidal organization of the market with specialized
reinsurers arise, and (iii) in which the relationship between capital structure
and reinsurance decisions is explicitly modelled. The model is admittedly
stylized but it is the Þrst step, to my knowledge, towards a theory of rein-
surance encompassing these three important features of the industry.
1.2 Main Intuition
The main intuition behind the model may be summarized as follows:
1. The representants of policyholders (large brokers, regulators) subject
insurance companies to capital requirements.
3see Doherty and Tinic (1981) for a detailed analysis of this point.
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2. Because of the expertise gap between risk managers and outside Þ-
nanciers, a moral hazard problem may prevent insurance companies
from meeting such capital requirements with outside Þnance.
3. Some risk managers may mitigate this problem by becoming reinsurers
and certifying risk management within primary insurance companies.
Of course, they should be subject in turn to a moral hazard problem.
But their certiÞcation may be credible if they take a suﬃciently high
stake in primary portfolios, namely if they write reinsurance treaties
with primary insurers.
Reinsurance capacity plays thus the role of an informed Þnancing. It is
of course more costly than uninformed outside Þnance. As a result, direct
insurers tap it only to the necessary extent: They seek to cede as little risk
as possible.
The two important building blocks of the model are moral hazard within
insurance companies and the reinsurers ability to mitigate it.
The reason why non life insurance companies are likely to suﬀer from
a particularly important moral hazard problem is the well known inversion
of the production cycle in insurance industry. The production costs of an
insurance company (claims) are revealed only a long time after business has
been underwritten and premiums cashed in, several years for long tailed
business lines. Moreover, the Þnal losses depend heavily upon insurers abil-
ity and eﬀorts to mitigate losses during the run oﬀ period4. These eﬀorts
and ability are hardly veriÞable by non experts outsiders, like shareholders
4The run oﬀ is the time interval between the claims and their settlements, which exceeds
5 years in many business lines.
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without a seat on the board. Indeed, it is not diﬃcult for a claim manager
to underreserve-namely underestimate the Þnal value of the claims-during
several years. Thus, she can enter into a Ponzi scheme (Þnance losses on the
run oﬀ of old underwriting years by underreserving for the recent ones) and
conceal an ineﬃcient losses management for quite a while.
This moral hazard problem being an important concern in non life in-
surance is epitomized by the following statement from Warren Buﬀet in the
Berkshire Hathaway 2002 Shareholders Letter:
"I can promise you that our top priority going forward is to
avoid inadequate reserving. But I cant guarantee success. The
natural tendency of most casualty-insurance managers is to un-
derreserve, and they must have a particular mindset-which, it
may surprise you, has nothing to do with actuarial expertise-if
they are to overcome this devastating bias."
As is well acknowledged by practitioners, reinsurers have the ability to
mitigate this problem because (i) they have more information about claims
and more risk management skills than outside Þnanciers; (ii) they are in
general involved in a long run, repeated relationship with ceding companies
who then behave so as to build a reputation. Doherty and Smetters (2002)
Þnd evidence that reinsurers play a role in loss mitigation, either by monitor-
ing ceding companies or by designing eﬃcient dynamic contracts (experience
rating).
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1.3 Organization Of The Paper
Section 2 outlines the model and solves for the (unique) equilibrium. Section
3 derives and comments some predictions of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
From a formal standpoint, the setup is a simple extension of Holmstrom and
Tirole (1997) model of Þnancial intermediation. Roughly, while Holmstrom
and Tirole consider an economy where entrepreneurs cannot monitor each
other5, this assumption is relaxed here: Risk managers can monitor each
other. The main building block of the model, capital constraints in direct
insurance business, is outlined in next Subsection. Subsection 2%2 presents
the general model and solves for the equilibria in the reinsurance and capital
markets.
2.1 Capital Constrained Insurers
We consider an economy with a continuum of insurers with unit mass. Each
insurer & ∈ [0! 1] contemplates underwriting a primary insurance portfolio 'i.
Throughout the paper, what is referred to as an "insurer" is the close-knit
team made of the top management and inside shareholders (e.g. members of
the board) of an insurance company, who has control over the risk manage-
ment and loss mitigation strategy. Insurance companies, like most Þnancial
5"We assume that Þrms cannot monitor other Þrms, perhaps because they have insuf-
Þcient capital to be credible monitors [...] or because they do not have the informational
expertise."
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institutions, are more likely to have such skilled top managers and inside
shareholders than industrial Þrms: This is required to obtain a license in
most countries.
The model is symmetric for notational simplicity. Each portolio 'i has
the following characteristics. The gross outcome from underwriting it (initial
capital plus premiums plus Þnancial proÞts minus claims and administrative
costs) is either nonnegative, with value (, or a large loss. The positive
outcome occurs with probability )B if the insurer enters into active loss miti-
gation, or )S if she "shirks". However, loss mitigation entails a non veriÞable
cost, namely the loss of a private beneÞt *% As usual in the moral hazard
literature, eﬀort comes at a cost but enhances the outcome in the sense of
Þrst order stochastic dominance:
∆) = )B − )S + 0
This very simple stochastic structure enables to abstract from any security
design consideration and focus on organizational issues, the aim of the paper.
The results are robust to more realistic claims modellings provided this Þrst-
order stochastic dominance property holds.
As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), let us also make the extreme as-
sumption that portfolios are perfectly positively correlated. This is meant to
emphasize that reinsurance does not depend in any way on a mutualisation
story in this model.
It is assumed that each insurer needs to commit an amount of capital
# in order to be allowed to underwrite her portfolio. The situation I have
in mind is that potential policyholders are dispersed and/or not Þnancially
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sophisticated, but that they are represented imperfectly by an institution6.
By setting a capital requirement, this institution ensures that the expected
default of each insurer is below some threshold. Such an objective underlies
the actuarial approaches of insurance regulation, based on ruin theory, as
well as the Value at Risk approaches in banking.
The representant of policyholders may be either a large broker who does
not oﬀer any business to insurers whose credit rating is too low, or a pru-
dential authority who does not let insurers operate if they fail to meet a
statutory capital requirement.
The insurers has an initial net wealth , - #% She can tap competitive
outside investors who have unlimited Þnancing capacities. In this case, for
simplicity, she makes them take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.
Besides insurance activity, there is an alternative investment opportunity
available to all the agents of this economy yielding an expected return . + 0%
All agents are protected by limited liability. They are risk neutral and do
not discount future cash ßows.
Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)! it is assumed that
)B( + (1 + .) # + )S( +*
Thus, an insurer cannot raise outside Þnance if she cannot credibly com-
mit to enter into active loss mitigation.
The model is identical to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) so far. If she
Þnds the funding and underwrites her portolio, an insurer carries out loss
mitigation only if her stake in the positive outcome, (I , is suﬃcient. More
6see Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for a detailed exposition of the representation hy-
pothesis underlying prudential regulation.
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